In this paper we analyze the previous attacks on the block cipher SHACAL-1 and show that all the differential-based attacks fail due to mistreatment of XOR differences through addition. We show that the previously published differential and rectangle attacks on SHACAL-1 fail as some of the underlying differentials are impossible. The relatedkey rectangle attacks on the cipher generally fail, but if some conditions are imposed on the key (i.e., for a weak key class) they work. After identifying the flaws in previous attacks, we present possible fixes to these attacks. We then present some modified differentials which lead to a related-key rectangle attack which can be applied to 2 504 weak keys. Our observations are then used to improve a related-key rectangle attack on IDEA by a factor of 2.
Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis [5] was introduced by Biham and Shamir in 1990 , and it is one of the most powerful known attacks on block ciphers. The related-key attack [1] was introduced by Biham in 1993. The attack considers the encryption under two unknown but related keys. The attack's applicability depends on the key schedule algorithm and shows that a block cipher with a weak key schedule algorithm may be vulnerable to this kind of attack. Many cryptanalytic results of this attack model were presented in [6, 10, 11, 12, 15] .
Illuminated by the complex local collisions of the analysis of SHA-0 which were pointed in the earlier papers in 1997 by X.Y.Wang [25] , SHA-0 [24] , and SHA-1 [22] , we show that in the case of SHACAL-1 [8] , all previous differential attacks [2, 7, 10, 13, 14, 17] fail due to this fact. For example, we show that the attack of [10] uses a differential that can never be satisfied. For other attacks, e.g., the related-key rectangle attack on the full SHACAL-1 in [7] , we show that the attack is applicable only to a weak key class (of 2 496 keys). We show that the combination of XOR differentials (or related-key XOR differentials) when the addition operation is used should be done in a very delicate manner.
After pointing out the problems in the various attacks on SHACAL-1, we try to salvage them. Some of the attacks are fully salvaged, while some others are either shortened (due to lower probabilities of the differentials), or are applicable only in a weak key class (which is larger than previously known).
We then present a related-key rectangle attack on the full SHACAL-1. We use two related-key differentials, where the first one of 33 rounds is built using the technique of modular differences, achieving high probability and correctness.
The new attack has a data complexity of 2 146 related-key chosen plaintexts and time complexity of 2 465 encryptions. The attack is successful against one out of 256 keys (or more precisely one quartet of keys out of 256 quartets). We summarize the results on SHACAL-1 and our findings in Table 1 .
The attack is applicable against the largest set of weak keys (one out of 256). Finally, we show how to improve the 6.5-round rectangle attack on IDEA from [4] by using the additive properties of the differentials. We succeed in reducing the time complexity of the attack by a factor of two.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we give the notations used in the paper, present SHACAL-1 and introduce some useful properties of the nonlinear functions in SHACAL-1. Section 3 describes the flaws in previous attacks against SHACAL-1. We present fixes to the various problems in Section 4. In Section 5 we give a related-key rectangle attack on the full SHACAL-1 which can be applied to one out of 2 8 keys (quartets of keys). We improve the 6.5-round related-key rectangle attack on IDEA in Section 6. Finally, we summarize the paper in Section 7.
Background

Notations
Throughout the paper we shall use the following notations which are partially based on these of [21, 23] :
-We shall address the words in a little endian manner, where x 0 is the least significant bit of x, and x 31 is the most significant bit of 32-bit words. [14] 30 (0-29) 2 110 CP 2 75 .1 AF Differential [14] 41 (0-40) 2 141 CP 2 491 AF Differential [17] 49 (0-48) 2 141 CP 2 496.5 AF Differential [17] 55 (15- ] is the value obtained by changing j 1 th, j 2 th, ..., j l th bits of x i . The "+" sign (which may be omitted) means that the bit is changed from 0 to 1, where the "−" denotes the opposite change. 
, where ROT L j (X) represents rotation of the 32-bit word X to the left by j bits, K i is the round subkey, Con i is the round constant, and
The ciphertext is composed of A 80 , B 80 , C 80 , D 80 and E 80 .
The key schedule of SHACAL-1 supports a variable key length of 0-512 bits. Keys shorter than 512 bits are first padded with as many zeroes as needed to obtain 512 bits. Let the 512-bit (padded) key be K = K 0 K 1 . . . K 15 , where K i is a 32-bit word. The key expansion of 512-bit K to 2560 bits is as follows:
We note that in [8] a minimal key length of 128-bit is required.
Several Propositions on the Differential Behavior of Addition and IF
In this section we present some properties of additive differences and XOR differences, as well as some properties of the nonlinear function IF (X, Y, Z) which were summarized in [22] . A 2 and B be n-bit words, and let
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that A 1,j = 0. Thus, A 2,j = 1, and
Hence, if C 1,j = 0 then C 2,j = 1 and there is no carry due to the difference, i.e., C 1 ⊕ C 2 = e j . In the other way, if C 1 ⊕ C 2 = e j , there was no carry by the addition of 2 j to C 1 , which means that A 1 , A 2 , B 1 and B 2 be n-bit words, and let
Proposition 2. Let
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that A 1,j = 0 and that A 2,j = 1, thus, 
Flaws in Previously Published Attacks
We find all previous differential attacks on SHACAL-1 have some flaws illuminated by Wang's modular difference. In some cases, these flaws prevent the attacks from being applicable to all keys. The first flaw, which affects the attacks in [2, 10, 13, 14, 17 ] is an impossibility flaw, i.e., the differentials which are used in these attacks can not hold. The second flaw, which affects the related-key attacks in [7, 10, 13] is the fact that the related-key differential holds only if the key satisfies some conditions. The third flaw is wrong keys which suggest the same number of "right" pairs/quartets as the right key. We show that the same pairs suggest even wrong keys.
The Use of Differentials with Probability 0
In the attacks of [2, 10, 13, 14, 17] there is a part of the differentials (or the relatedkey differentials) which cannot hold. We present the problem with the related-key differential of [10] , but note that the key difference has no affect on the problem, and thus it exists in all the attacks mentioned earlier.
The related-key rectangle attack on 70-round SHACAL-1 [10] uses a 33-round related-key differential characteristic for rounds 0-32 with probability 2 −45 . The differential characteristic in [10] from round 6 to round 12 is shown in Table 2 .
We shall now prove that this differential characteristic can never hold, i.e., the actual probability is 0. Let A, B, C, D, E and A * , B * , C * , D * , E * be the intermediate encryption values corresponding to a pair which allegedly satisfies this differential. 11, 6 and A * 11,1 = E * 11, 6 . By
and proposition 2, we obtain that A 12 = A * 12 , i.e., ΔA 12 = 0, which is a contradiction with ΔA 12 = 0 in the differential characteristic.
To summarize the above, as there is no carry from the addition of the differences in round 6, the sign of A 7,8 is the same as the sign of A 6,3 . The sign of A 6,3 is then copied to A 11,1 (as there is no carry). Thus, when these two differences enter the addition in round 12 they have the same sign, and thus, cannot cancel each other. Therefore the attack on 70-round SHACAL-1 [10] is infeasible (as well as other attacks which use this transition).
We note that when considering only XOR differences (as was done in [10] ), the probabilities of the differential is larger than 0. However, only when we consider modular difference, this problem is found.
Conditions on the Keys
The related-key differential attacks [7, 10, 13] have to deal with another issue which follows from the addition operation. Some of the XOR differences of the differentials can hold only if some key conditions are applied. We show that the related-key attacks in [7, 10, 13] imposes conditions on the keys, so they can actually be used only for weak key classes. The attack in [13] has one such condition, the attack in [10] has 2 conditions, and the attack in [7] has 16 conditions. Thus, the attack of [7] is applicable only for a weak key class with the size of 2 496 keys (rather than all the keys as implicitly assumed in [7] ).
Consider rounds 26-34 of the first related-key differential used in [7] which are depicted in Table 3 . Consider for example the difference e 2 in A 27 , we know the the sign of this difference is as the sign of key difference that caused it. In order for this difference to be canceled during the addition of round 27 (with the key difference of K 27 ), by proposition 2 it must hold that the sign of the key difference is opposite to that of A 27,2 . This imposes a condition on the keys Table 3 . The Related-Key Differential Characteristic in [7] (Steps 26-34)
used in the attack, as otherwise, there is going to be a carry, and the relatedkey differential cannot hold. We note that the same problem exists in the first related-key differential of [7] in five other places, in rounds 0-1, 4-5, 29-30, 32-33, and rounds 26-31 (where the sign of the difference in E 31 should be the opposite of the sign of the key difference). The same is true for the second related-key differential used in rounds 34-69, where 10 conditions are imposed on the key. As a side observation, we note that when the keys satisfy these conditions, the probability of the transitions is increased, as we are assured that the required differences cancel. Thus, while this defines a weak key class which contains one out of 2 16 keys (or more precisely a quartet of keys), for these weak keys, the probabilities of the differentials are actually 2 −35 and 2 −29 rather than 2 −41 and 2 −39 for the first and second differentials, respectively.
In Table 4 we summarize for the three related-key attacks the number of conditions imposed on any of the related-key differentials, derive the weak key class size, and the actual data and time complexities of the attacks in the weak key class. We ignored the impossibility issues that were mentioned earlier, but we remind the reader that these attacks still fail due to the previously mentioned reasons.
Wrong Keys That Pass the Basic Attacks
While this problem is the smallest of all, this observation can actually be used to reduce the time complexities of the attacks (usually by a negligible factor). Consider for example the last step in the attack from [7] :
"Partially decrypt all the remaining quartets (under the corresponding keys) . . . For each of the remaining quartets, check whether
Consider for example the case where the most significant bit of the real key is flipped. As noted in [7] , this has no affect on the difference of the pair. Thus, when checking the real key, and the real key with a flipped most significant bit, the same quartets are suggested. More accurately, if we consider the additive The first three attacks fail. The number of weak keys is the number of weak keys quartets out of all the 2 512 possible ones which satisfy the related-key XOR differences.
differences in the last step of the attack, the additive difference depends on the additive difference of the subkey and the data, and not on the actual key bits. Thus, all bit positions which are more significant than all the bits with difference in the key, has no affect whatsoever on the difference of a pair.
Thus, in the case of the attack from [7] the number of subkeys which has more than two quartets is increased by 2 27 . One one hand this increases the time complexity of the exhaustive key search phase by a factor of 2 27 . On the other hand, as there is no point in guessing these key bits during the normal execution of the attack (again besides in the exhaustive key search phase), their guesses and partial decryptions during the attacks can be eliminated.
We observe that the each of these keys is suggested by the same quartet. Thus, increasing the data used in the attack has no effect on the correctness of the attack.
Fixing the Previous Attacks
We concentrate at showing how to fix the the differential attack on 55-round SHACAL-1 from [17] . We show that by using the correct modular differences we obtain a valid attack on 49-round SHACAL-1. The new modular differential uses the cases where we add two difference, either they have the opposite signs (and produce no carry) or they are in the most significant bit. We also note that when a difference in the most significant bit is introduced, its sign might change without producing a carry. This might be useful in cases where a difference is introduced, and we need to change its sign (the change of sign occurs with probability 1/2, and it may happen without carry, while for other bit positions this occurs with probability 1/2, but produces a carry).
We summarize in Table 5 the parameters of the fixed attacks: the new number of rounds, the new data and time complexity. We also list the major changes that must be done to these attacks to make them work. We note that the best attack on SHACAL-1 in the regular model (i.e., with one key) is a 51-round rectangle attack on rounds 0-50. As before, change the first related-key differential. CP: Chosen Plaintexts, CC: Chosen Ciphertexts, RK-CP: Relate-Key Chosen Plaintexts. WK: Weak Key Class (with size).
Fixing the Differential Attacks
For the differential attack in [17] we change the used differential. The basic 24-round differential is given in Table 9 in the Appendix. The basic 24-round differential from [17] (which is extended 16 more rounds) has four contradictions. Thus, we first start by fixing the first three by changing the differential conditions from XOR ones to modular ones. The fourth contradiction is solved by rotating the differential such that the problematic addition occurs with both differences in the most significant bit.
The new 24-round differential has probability of 2 −52 , compared to the claimed probability of the flawed differential of 2 −50 . It is possible to improve the probability of the new differential by a factor of 2 6 by fixing several plaintext bits which ensure the transitions that we seek. For example, by fixing C 0,22 = D 0,22 , we make sure that despite the difference in B 0,22 , there is no difference in IF (B 0,22 , C 0,22 , D 0,22 ). We also note that by negating the signs (i.e., flipping all the signs) in the differential, we obtain a second differential with the same probability.
The extension of this differential forward and backward is a bit more complex than in [17] . This is mostly due to the fact that we have to maintain the correctness of the differential by restricting the signs of the differences. In Table 10 in the appendix we present a possible extension of the 24-round differential to the six rounds before the differential (the 24-round differential can be used also for rounds 40-63). Table 11 presents a possible extension of the 24-round differential (whether this is in rounds 24-29 or in rounds 64-68). Thus, it is possible to construct a 36-round differential for SHACAL-1 in rounds 33-68 with probability 2 −157 (which can be improved to 2 −144 by fixing the equivalent of 13 plain text bits).
Using this 36-round differential, we can attack rounds 18-68. This is done in a chosen ciphertext attack. The attacker has to fix 10 bits to satisfy the additive requirements of the differential, and thus, it is impossible to use the differential as-is (as its probability is 2 −157 , i.e., 2 157 pairs are needed). However, if we use structures of 2 32 ciphertexts each, we eliminate the last round of the differential (round 68), and thus increase the probability of the differential by a factor of 2 −14 , and reduce 2 conditions on the ciphertexts. In exchange for that, we cannot automatically distinguish right pairs (as each plaintext has 2 32 candidate counterparts).
The attacker obtains 2 144 chosen ciphertexts (in 2 112 structures), and asks for their decryption. Then, he guesses the subkeys of rounds 68, and rounds 20-29, partially encrypts the obtained plaintexts, and then repeats the early abort technique found in [17] and in our attack described later. The resulting attack has a time complexity of about 2 496 encryptions.
A New Related-Key Rectangle Attack on the Full SHACAL-1
The key schedule of SHACAL-1 is operated by a linear shift feedback register, and has slow diffusion, i.e., low difference propagations. If we fix a difference of any consecutive 16 subkeys, the differences in the remaining 64 subkeys are known. The key schedule weaknesses of SHACAL-1 allows us to obtain two consecutive good related-key differential characteristics. We can constructed a 33-round related-key differential characteristic for rounds 0-32 (E 0 ) without any conditions on the key. For the rounds 33-65 (E 1 ) we use a differential characteristic based on the the second differential used in [7] and we impose 8 conditions on the key. The characteristics are given in the Appendix. We combine the two related-key differential characteristics to obtain a 66-round related-key rectangle distinguisher for SHACAL-1.
Related-Key Differential Characteristics for SHACAL-1
We first propose a 66-round related-key rectangle distinguisher based on the differentials found in the Appendix. The input difference for the first sub-cipher Table 6 . Values for Plaintexts bits that Increase the Probability of the Differential of Table 7   A0  B0  C0  D0  A0, The key difference is ΔK * = (e31, e31, 0, 0, e31, 0, 0, 0, e31, 0, e31, 0, e31, 0, e31, 0). [3] , [3, −20] , [16, 31] , 2 13 − 2 10 − 2 6 ), and the output difference is β = (e 10,0 , e 5 , e 30 , 0, 0) under key difference ΔK * with probability 2 −35 . For the second sub-cipher the input difference γ = (e 1 , e 1 , 0, e 30,31 , e 31 ) becomes output difference δ = (0, e 3 , 0, 0, e 0 ) under key difference ΔK with probability 2 −36 . The second differential defines a weak key class which contains one out of 2 8 keys, for these weak keys, the probability of the second differential is increased to 2 −28 (= 2 −36 · 2 8 ). The probability of the first three rounds of the first differential can be increased by a factor of 2 9 by fixing the equivalent of 9 plaintext bits (presented in Table 6 ) in each of the plaintexts of the pair, and after the increase the probability of the first differential is 2 −35 . Thus, starting with N plaintext pairs with input difference α and fixed the 9 bits in each of the plaintexts to the first sub-cipher we expect 
The Key Recovery Attack Procedure for the Full SHACAL-1 with 512-Bit Keys
Let the four different unknown keys be K,
where ΔK * is the key difference of the first related-key differential and ΔK is the key difference for the second key differential. Assume the plaintexts P , P * , P and P * are encrypted under the keys K, K * , K and K * respectively. Denote the intermediate values encrypted under E 0 by IM , IM * , IM and IM * , respectively. (P, P * ) and (P , P * ) are the pairs with respect to the first differential, and (IM, IM ), (IM * , IM * ) are the pairs with respect to the second differential, i.e. (C, C ), (C * , C * ) are the pairs with respect to the second differential.
We denote the 160-bit value X i is by the five 32-bit words X iA , X iB , X iC , X iD and X iE . Also, we denote the set of all possible additive differences of ΔA 67 by S . The attack finds the four related-keys using 2 146 related-key chosen plaintexts using the following algorithm:
1. Choose two pools of 2 144 plaintext pairs (P i , P * i ) and (P j , P * j ) such that (a) P * i − P i = P * j − P j = α; (b) P i and P * j have the fixed bits as given in Table 6 and required by the modular differential, i.e., for P i : P iA,3 = P iA,8 = P iA,20 = P iB,16 = P iC,1 = P iC,20 = P iD,3 = 1, P iA,1 = P iB,3 = P iB,20 = P iB,31 = P iC,3 = P iD,16 = 0, and P iA,12 = P iB,12 , P iB,10 = P iC, 8 . 
The key difference is ΔK = (e1,6,28,29,31, e0, 4,6,28,30,31, e5,28,30, e29,0, e1,4,5,29,30, e1,6,29,30,31, e1,6,29, e6,29,30,31, e29,30, e0,31, e5, e1, e1,4,6,30, e1,6,30,31, e4,6,29,30,31, e1,29 (c) P i , P * i , P j and P * j are encrypted using the keys K, K * , K and K * , respectively, which result in the ciphertexts 
, and the additive difference between X iE and X jE (and the additive difference between X * iE and X * jE ). Check whether X iE ⊕ X jE = ΔE 66 = e 0 and discard all the quartets that do not satisfy the condition. (b) For each of the remaining quartets, check whether X * iE ⊕ X * jE = ΔE 66 = e 0 and discard all the quartets that do not satisfy the condition. 6 . Exhaustively search for the remaining 94 key bits by trial encryption for the suggested key k.
The first 9 fixed bits as given in Step 1(b) of P i ensure that the probability of the first differential is increased by a factor of 2 9 . According to the input difference of the plaintexts, we will know that P * i , P j and P * j also have the 9 fixed bits as given in Table 6 , i.e. P * 12 , etc. Besides these bits, the nature of the modular differential, i.e., the signs, set 6 more bits to predetermined values. These 6 bits in Step 1(b) are deduced as follows: for each bit whose difference according to the differential from Table 7 is positive, we set P i to be zero and P fixed bits respectively, and we choose 2 144 pairs (P i , P * i ) and (P j , P * j ), which can be realized while each plaintext has 160 bits.
According to the key schedule of SHACAL-1, we know that for the pairs we consider, ΔK 67 = e 1,4 , ΔK 68 = e 1,9 and ΔK 69 = e 1,3,4 . A pair which satisfies the differential has difference in bit B 66,3 , i.e., the difference in B 66 is either [3] or [−3] (or more precisely, after the XOR of the three words the difference is either [3] 
Improving the Attack on IDEA
A careful investigation of the way XOR differences behave through addition can also be used to improve results of previous attacks. Consider for example the related-key rectangle attack on 6.5-round IDEA from [4] . The attack uses two related-key differentials, where the first related-key differential starts with an input difference (0, 0, 0001 x , 0), while the key difference is in bit 40, and with probability 1/2 the key difference cancels the input difference. While in [4] , the probability of this first part of the differential was assumed to be half, it is actually 1 for plaintext pairs with the opposite sign of the key difference, and 0 for plaintext pairs with the same sign.
The above observation lead to an obvious improvement. The attacker first considers only pairs with the same sign in the differing bit, and applies the attack. If the attack fails, the attacker repeats the attack with the opposite sign.
We note that this approach indeed increases the value ofp by a factor of two. Thus, for the right guess of the sign, the data complexity can be reduced by a factor of two (recall that the number of pairs is proportional to 1/pq). However, the actual sign of the key difference is unknown, thus the attack has to be repeated twice -once for each guess (each time with half the data).
However, we gain a factor of two in the time complexity, as in each application we have only a quarter of the number of quartets that we expected in the original attack. As the attack is repeated twice, then the total number of analyzed quartets is reduced by a factor of two.
We note that for a differential attack a similar scenario holds (no reduction in the data complexity, but a possible reduction in the time complexity). However, for boomerang attacks, as the data complexity is proportional to 1/p 2q2 , then we expect a reduction in the data complexity besides the probable reduction in time complexity.
Conclusion
In this paper we identified the misuse of XOR differences through addition. The observation led us to examine all the differential-based attacks on SHACAL-1, showing that these attacks fail. After pointing out the problems and by using modular differences, we fix some of the attacks, and present the best known (valid) attack on SHACAL-1 in the one key model (a rectangle attack on the first 51 rounds).
We continue to present a new related-key rectangle attack on the full SHACAL-1, which is applicable to one out of 256 keys (rather than out of 2 14 for the previously best result). The new attack uses 2 146 chosen plaintexts (or 2
144
chosen plaintexts) and has a time complexity of 2 465 SHACAL-1 encryptions (or 2 494 SHACAL-1 encryptions, respectively).
We verified all the differentials that we used in the paper. Each differential was tested under 100 keys (or 100 key pairs), where each time we verified several rounds of the differential. The sets of rounds were chosen to be overlapping to reduce the chance that some condition from one round affects the differential's behavior in a later round.
We conclude that differential attacks should be very carefully applied when XOR differences are used in addition. We note that the related-key rectangle attack based on the modular differences can be applied to analyze other block ciphers, thus increasing the toolbox of the cryptanalyst. 
